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Recent Developments 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain: 
THE UNITEDST ATES GOVERN-
MENT MAY ABDUCT FOREIGN 
CITIZENS FROM FOREIGN TER-
RITORY UNLESS EXPRESSLY 
FORBIDDEN BY AN EXTRADI-
TION TREATY. 
In United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992), the 
United States Supreme Court held that 
the U.S. government may forciblyab-
duct a foreign national to bring that 
person to trial for alleged violations of 
federal criminal law. The Court stated 
that an extradition treaty between the 
United States and a foreign nation cre-
ates a mechanism to deliver criminal 
suspects, but does not limit the 
government's options unless expressly 
stated in the treaty. As such, a forcible 
abduction to gain jurisdiction over a 
foreign national does not create a juris-
dictional defense in a United States 
District Court. 
In the late 1980s, Enrique Camarena, 
a special agent for the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration ("DEA"), was 
kidnapped and murdered while inves-
tigating drug trafficking through 
Mexico. An autopsy revealed that he 
had been severely tortured before dy-
ing. The DEA believed that Humberto 
Alvarez-Machain ("Alvarez"), aMexi-
can doctor, intentionally prolonged 
Camarena's life to allow further tor-
ture and interrogation. A federal in-
dictment was issued for Alvarez's ar-
rest. 
After DEA officials unsuccessfully 
attempted to gain custody of Alvarez 
through informal negotiations with 
Mexican officials, the DEA offered a 
reward plus expenses to the person 
who delivered Alvarez to the United 
States. On April 2, 1990 DEA officials 
arrested Alvarez after he had been forc-
ibly kidnapped in Guadalajara, Mexico 
and flown in a private plane to El Paso, 
Texas. Though they were not person-
ally involved, DEA agents were re-
sponsible for the kidnapping. 
In the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California, 
Alvarez moved for dismissal claiming 
that the court lacked jurisdiction. His 
claim was based on alleged violations 
of the Extradition Treaty ('"Treaty") 
between the United States and Mexico. 
After concluding that Alvarez's ab-
duction did violate the Treaty, the dis-
trict court ordered that Alvarez be re-
patriated to Mexico. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the lower court and concluded 
that the government-backed abduction, 
combined with the official Mexican 
protests, violated the ''pwpose'' of the 
Treaty. 
On appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court, the United States princi-
pally argued that the forcible, interna-
tional abduction did not bar the district 
court's jurisdiction because such ac-
tion failed to invoke the treaty. Id. at 
2193. Alvarez, on the other hand, 
contended that the Treaty applied and 
that its implied terms established ex-
tradition as the exclusive means forthe 
United States to gain custody of a 
person located on Mexican soil. Id. 
Even though it had not previously 
addressed this precise issue, the Court 
noted that it had separately addressed 
two key sub-issues in cases involving 
alleged violations of the extradition 
treaties andjurisdictional claims based 
on forcible abductions. The Court, 
after reviewing the relevant case law, 
embraced the government's argument 
that the key issue was whether the 
Treaty had been invoked. Id. If the 
Treaty was not invoked, then the "forc-
ible abduction [was] no sufficient rea-
son why the party [Alvarez] should not 
answer" for the offense. Id. (quoting 
Ker v. Rlinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886». 
If the Treaty was invoked, then the 
Court would determine whether the 
abduction violated the Treaty. How-
ever, notwithstanding the factual basis 
of Ker, the Court simplified the issue 
by ruling that governmental involve-
ment in the abduction was irrelevant. 
Id at 2192 n.7. 
The Court found that the Treaty 
neither directed the parties to refrain 
from forcible abductions, nor explained 
the consequences if either party took 
such action. Id. at 2193. Alvarez 
argued that Articles 22(1) and (9) es-
tablished that the Treaty was meant to 
prohibit forcible international abduc-
tions. Id. Article 22( 1) stated that the 
Treaty shall apply to certain crimes 
(including murder) whether the crime 
occurred before or after the enactment 
of the Treaty. Alvarez argued that this 
section made application of the Treaty 
compulsory forthe listed crimes. Id. at 
2194. Nevertheless, the Court inter-
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preted the section as simply denoting 
that the Treaty related back to crimes 
which occurred before the Treaty was 
ratified. Id. 
Next the Court determined that sec-
tion 9 of the Treaty "provide[d] a 
mechanism [for extradition] which 
would not otherwise exist," but did not 
represent the only mechanism for gain-
ing custody. Id. at 2193-94. Article 9 
provided that afterreceiving an official 
request for extradition, a nation could 
either extradite the requested person or 
prosecute the person on its own. Id. at 
2194. Thus, Alvarez contended, Ar-
ticle 9 specified the only manner in 
which a nation could gain custody over 
an individual on foreign soil. He as-
serted that the restrictions and proce-
dures established by the Treaty be-
came superfluous if either nation was 
allowed to circumvent the Treaty 
through forcible abductions. Id. The 
Court bolstered its position, however, 
by noting that Mexico had actual no-
tice of the Ker doctrine and the 
doctrine's applicability to the Treaty. 
Id. 
Finally, the Court rQled that the 
general international law's prohibition 
of forcible abductions did not have 
effect under the Treaty, nor required 
that a similar prohibition be implied 
into the Treaty. Id. at 2194. Alvarez 
recognized that under the Treaty, the 
rights of the abducted individual were 
a derivative of the rights of the alleg-
edly aggrieved nation. As such, once 
that nation protested the abduction, the 
nation's rights under the Treaty were 
traDsformed into the individual's rights 
under the international law. Alvarez 
concluded that because both the ab-
duction violated his individual rights 
and Mexico filed a protest, the Treaty 
must be enforced on his behalf to bar 
the in personam jurisdiction of the 
United States District Court. Id. at 
2195. The Court rejected this theory 
fortwo reasons. First, the Court opined 
that such rigid enforcement produced 
unjust results if one nation acted offen-
sively toward the other. Id. Second, 
the Court pronounced that only the law 
between nations specifically applied to 
extradition treaties should be consid-
ered, not the full body of the general 
international law. Id. 
A lengthy dissent written by Justice 
Stevens and joined by Justices 
Blackmun and O'Connor condemned 
the majority ruling fortuming the terms 
of the Treaty into little more than ver-
biage. The dissent accused the Court's 
entire opinion ofbeing critically flawed 
because it failed to differentiate be-
tween private conduct and governmen-
tal action. Id at 2203. The dissent 
concluded that the abduction was ex-
pressly sanctioned by the Executive 
Branch and was therefore constituted a 
flagrant breach of the Treaty. Id. 
Thus, the majority ofthe Supreme 
Court, in U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, held 
that the U.S. government may solicit 
the forcible abduction of a foreign na-
tional in order to obtain jurisdiction 
over that person. In so doing, the Court 
established the rule that the existence 
of an extradition treaty between the 
nations is consequential only if the 
treaty is invoked. This decision may 
seriously affect the United States's fu-
ture efforts to initiate joint actions with 
foreign nations who are already leery 
of the United States. After this case 
was decided, Mexico promptly ceased 
all joint actions with the DEA and also 
began the process ofre-evaluating the 
Treaty. However, it is likely that the 
Court sought to make the "right" deci-
sion under the circumstances in order 
to allow the courts to decide the inno-
cence, or guilt, of an alleged villain. 
By adopting the approach that an ex-
tradition treaty must be invoked to 
have affect, the Court eliminated treaty-
based jurisdictional challenges to in-
ternational abductions and granted the 
United States a free hand to grab sus-
pected criminals and bring them to 
trial. 
- Brett R. Wilson 
MVA v. Chamberlain: DRUNKDRIV-
ERS NEED NOT BE INFORMED 
OF ALLDISP ARITIESBETWEEN 
SANCTIONS FOR FAILING A 
CHEMICAL ALCOHOL CON-
CENTRATION TEST AND RE-
FUSING TO TAKE SUCH A TEST 
ALTOGETHER. 
In a unanimous decision interpret-
ing sections of Maryland's transporta-
tion statutes relating to drunk driving, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
MV A v. Chamberlain, 326 Md. 296, 
604 A.2d 919 (1992), ruled that a po-
lice officer is not required to inform an 
intoxicated motorist of all potential 
differences in penalties between refus-
ing and failing a chemical alcohol con-
centration test. In so holding, the Court 
declined to recognize additional pro-
cedural protection for motorists who 
decline to submit to a blood alcohol 
test. 
The defendant Chamberlain was 
stopped by a police officer for speed-
ing and suspicion of driving while 
intoxicated Afterthe officerpenormed 
some field sobriety tests on Chamber-
lain, the officer placed Chamberlain 
under arrest for driving while intoxi-
cated. Then, quoting section 16-205.1 
of the Transportation Article of the 
Maryland Annotated Code, the officer 
informed Chamberlain of his rights 
pertaining to taking a chemical test to 
determine his blood alcohol level. 
The officer told Chamberlain of his 
right to refuse to submit to the test but 
warned that a refusal would result in an 
administrative suspension ofhis Mary-
land driver's license. Additionally, the 
officer stipulated that "[ s ]uspension by 
the Motor Vehicle Administration shall 
be 120 days for a first offense and one 
year for a second or subsequent of-
fense." Chamberlain, 326 Md. at 310, 
604 A.2d at 921 (quoting Md. Trans. 
Code Ann. § 16-205. 1 (b) (1987». 
Chamberlain was also told of the 
consequences of failing to take the test. 
The officer, quoting from an advice of 
rights form, warned Chamberlain that 
if he submitted to the test, and the 
results indicated an alcohol concentra-
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